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Multiple studies and weak evidential defeat
Nikk Effingham1 • Malcolm J. Price2
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Abstract When a study shows statistically significant correlation between an
exposure and an outcome, the credence of a real connection between the two
increases. Should that credence remain the same when it is discovered that further
independent studies between the exposure and other independent outcomes were
conducted? Matthew Kotzen argues that it should remain the same, even if the
results of those further studies are discovered. However, we argue that it can differ
dependent upon the results of the studies.
Keywords Philosophy of epidemiology Multiple testing Multiplicity  Bayesian 
Evidential defeat
Introduction
Let u and w be any two factors. A study provides significant results between u and
w if and only if that study reports a statistically significant correlation between u
and w which would have had only a 1% probability of occurring in the absence of a
real connection. A real connection exists between u and w if and only if some
variety of causal connection can be traced between u and w. Chance alone allows
for studies to show significant results when no real connection exists. Chance alone
also allows a real connection to exist between factors without significant results
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appearing in a study, though, for the sake of argument, this article assumes that this
never happens.
Imagine reading a study showing significant results between u and w. It is then
discovered that further independent studies examining the connection between u
and some other outcomes have been conducted. ‘Defeatists’ believe that if those
studies are discovered, the subjective probability of there being a real connection
between u and w (i.e., our rational credence) should necessarily lower. But Matthew
Kotzen argues to the contrary [1]. Whilst this article does not contest that the mere
existence of the other studies is irrelevant, we argue that Kotzen goes too far in
thinking that the results of the studies are also irrelevant.
Defeatism
Imagine the following:
‘Single study scenario’: We read a study showing significant results between
ingesting peanut butter and cholesterol lowering.
Say REALCONNECTION is the proposition that those factors have a real connection (i.e.,
that eating peanut butter has a causal connection with lower cholesterol). Say
SIGNIFICANTRESULTS is the proposition that a study on peanut butter consumption and
lower cholesterol shows significant results. Before reading the study, a person has a
measure of belief that peanut butter lowers cholesterol, which presumably goes up once
she reads the study, i.e., P(REALCONNECTION|SIGNIFICANTRESULTS)[P(REALCONNECTION).
Now, imagine that Imaginary Peanut Butter Inc., the fictional commissioning
body of the make-believe study, has conducted 999 other studies. Each study
examined the association between peanut butter and a factor other than lower
cholesterol (e.g., peanut butter and conception rates, peanut butter and resistance to
dengue fever, etc.). Call this the ‘multiple study scenario’. Given that the probability
of a study producing significant results when there is no real connection is (by our
definition of ‘statistically significant’) 1%, on average, roughly ten of the 1000
studies conducted in the multiple study scenario would show significant results by
mere chance alone. If, for example, 11 of the studies returned significant results, the
likeliest explanation would be that one study reflects a real connection whilst the
other ten are mere stochastic detritus. Since the lower cholesterol study is but one
study amongst the eleven, it is probable that it is amongst the mere detritus.
Therefore, one should think P(REALCONNECTION|SIGNIFICANTRESULTS) is lower in the
multiple study scenario than in the single study scenario. This is the reasoning of the
‘defeatist’.
Defeatists can be divided into two varieties: strong and weak. Strong defeatists
believe that in all such situations, the existence of further studies necessarily lowers
one’s credence that the original study shows a real connection. Specifically, the
strong defeatist believes that the results of those studies are irrelevant. Weak
defeatists believe that merely knowing of the existence of further studies does not
lower one’s credence of there being a real connection. Instead, the weak defeatist
says one needs to know what the results of those studies are. Further, in light of
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those results, the credences that the connection assessed in the original study is real
may remain unchanged, decrease, or increase.
Kotzen argues that both forms of defeatism are false [1]. We do not contest
strong defeatism being false, but we do argue that weak defeatism is true.
Kotzen’s dice analogies
Single and multiple dice scenarios
Kotzen’s first argument against defeatism depends upon an analogy. Imagine a vat
of 1,000,000 dice. One percent of the dice are biased and are perfectly weighted to
always roll a ‘6’; the remainder are fair. A die is selected from the whole vat. Call
the die ‘Harry’. HARRYISBIASED is the proposition that Harry is biased.
P(HARRYISBIASED) clearly mirrors the percentage of biased dice in the vat, i.e.,
P(HARRYISBIASED) = 0.01. But now imagine that Harry is rolled three times and
comes up ‘6’ each time. Call this the ‘single die scenario’.
In the single die scenario, what should the probability be of Harry being biased?
That is, where THREE6S is the proposition that Harry came up with three 6S in a row,
what is P(HARRYISBIASED|THREE6S)? It is easy to calculate. Given Kolmgorov’s
axioms,
PðHarryIsBiasedjThree6sÞ ¼ PðThree6s^HarryIsBiasedÞ
PðThree6sÞ
Obviously, P(THREE6S) is equal to P(THREE6S^HARRYISBIASED) ? P(THREE6S
^:HARRYISBIASED). Further, given De Finetti’s axiom,
PðThree6s^:HarryIsBiasedÞ ¼ PðThree6sjHarryIsBiasedÞ  PðHarryIsBiasedÞ
¼ 0:01
and
PðThree6s^:HarryIsBiasedÞ ¼ PðThree6sj:HarryIsBiasedÞ
 Pð:HarryIsBiasedÞ
 0:005:
Overall, P(HARRYISBIASED|THREE6S) & 0.686.
Now consider a different scenario. Imagine that rather than rolling Harry, Harry
is placed back in the vat and then 100,000 dice are randomly selected from the vat
and all rolled three times. Of the dice that come up ‘6’ each time, one is randomly
selected. What is the probability that such a die is biased? Call this the ‘multiple
dice scenario’. Where the die in the single die scenario is called Harry, call the
selected die in the multiple dice scenario ‘Laura’. So the question is, what value
does P(LAURAISBIASED) take?
The answer is straightforward: exactly the same as P(HARRYISBIASED|THREE6S).
Imagine the 100,000 dice are instead rolled one by one. Imagine that the first die to
be rolled rolls three 6S in a row. We put it aside and call it ‘Laura’. Clearly, Laura is
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now just like Harry from the single die scenario, i.e. P(LAURAISBIASED) & 0.686. It
is equally clear that the rolling of 99,999 more dice is irrelevant to that
probability—rolling those dice would not make any difference to the probability
of Laura being biased. This scenario, where the dice are rolled one by one, is
functionally identical to the multiple dice scenario, for it makes no difference
whether the dice are rolled one by one or all together. Further, it makes no
difference whether the dice are rolled one by one and Laura happens to be the first
die rolled, or whether all the dice are rolled simultaneously and Laura is the one
picked out from amongst the dice that rolled three 6S. Kotzen’s conclusion, with
which we concur, is that the same credence should be given to Laura and Harry
being biased in both scenarios.
On the back of this conclusion, Kotzen argues that defeatism is false because the
pairs of scenarios are analogous. The single die scenario is analogous to the single
study scenario. Rolling three 6S in a row is analogous to a random study showing
significant results, i.e. P(THREE6S) is analogous to P(SIGNIFICANTRESULTS). Randomly
selecting a biased die is analogous to randomly selecting a study on factors which
bear a real connection to one another, i.e. P(HARRYISBIASED) is analogous to
P(REALCONNECTION). A die which has rolled three 6S in a row being biased is
analogous to a study that shows significant results being on factors bearing
a real connection, i.e. P(HARRYISBIASED|THREE6S) is analogous to
P(REALCONNECTION|SIGNIFICANTRESULTS).
Similarly, the multiple dice scenario is analogous to the multiple study scenario.
Multiple dice being rolled is the same as multiple studies being conducted. In the
same way that ‘Laura’ is defined as one of the dice that rolled three 6S, the study in
the multiple study scenario is guaranteed to be one from amongst those that showed
significant results. In the same way that P(HARRYISBIASED|THREE6S) = P(LAUR-
AISBIASED), the probability of a study being on factors with a real connection, given
that one is reading a study which shows significant results, is the same in both the
single study scenario and the multiple study scenario. That is, the existence of the
other studies is irrelevant to one’s credence that the study one is reading is on
factors with a real connection or not, i.e. strong defeatism is false.
The relevant disanalogy
The multiple dice scenario makes no mention of the results of the other 99,999 dice;
whatever they rolled is irrelevant to P(LAURAISBIASED). If the multiple dice scenario
is analogous to the multiple study scenario, then the results of the other studies are
irrelevant to P(REALCONNECTION|SIGNIFICANTRESULTS) and weak defeatism is also
false. It is at this step that we find fault since the dice scenarios are subtly
disanalogous to the study scenarios. Start by examining one reason Kotzen
considers for thinking that P(LAURAISBIASED)\ P(HARRYISBIASED|THREE6S). Recall
that in the multiple dice scenario Harry is pulled out of the vat but is not rolled.
Instead, Harry is replaced and the 100,000 dice are rolled instead (from which Laura
is selected). We nevertheless have a value of P(HARRYISBIASED), and given the
mathematics above, P(LAURAISBIASED) is a function of it. If the results of the
100,000 dice affect P(HARRYISBIASED) then they would likewise affect
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P(LAURAISBIASED). But Kotzen thinks that the results of the dice rolls should not
alter P(HARRYISBIASED):
After all, we know that the jar contains a large number of (stipulatively
randomized) dice, and we know that 99% of them are fair and that 1% of them
are biased. Presumably, even the Defeatist wants to allow that when you pick
just one die… at random from a jar with such a composition of dice, a rational
agent’s prior credence in [HARRYISBIASED] should be .01. [1, pp. 163–164]
The first sentence in this quote is the bone of contention. In the dice case, Kotzen
stipulates that the proportion of biased dice is known. But when studies are
conducted, one cannot be certain of the proportion of studies which will be on
factors with a real connection. Thus, there is a disanalogy.1
We start with the dice scenarios. In the original dice scenario, P(HARRYISBIASED)
mirrors the percentage of dice believed to be biased (i.e. P(HARRYISBIASED) = 0.01)
and does not alter when the rest of the dice are rolled. But when one becomes
uncertain about the percentage of biased dice, this need not be true. Just as long as
the results of the dice influence, to some degree, one’s belief about what proportion
of dice are biased, the results of the dice bear on P(HARRYISBIASED). Intuitively, this
is so. Imagine that it is unclear what proportion of the dice are biased. 100,000 dice
are rolled and all come up three 6S in a row. One would then strongly suspect that all
of the dice, Laura included, are biased, i.e., fix P(HARRYISBIASED) close to 1 (and, by
extension, P(LAURAISBIASED) would be close to 1). But if 100,000 dice are rolled and
50,231 roll three 6S, then that result would be most likely if 50% were biased; if we
then fixed P(HARRYISBIASED) at 0.5, P(LAURAISBIASED)—being the same as
P(HARRYISBIASED|THREE6S)—would be approximately 0.995. And if, after 100,000
dice are rolled, 1001 roll three 6S in a row then—since that is approximately the
average result if roughly one in 100,000 dice were biased—we would alter our value
of P(HARRYISBIASED) to be 0.00001. In that case, P(LAURAISBIASED) & 0.0022
rather than 0.686.
In short, if one is uncertain what proportion of dice are biased, but nevertheless
has access to the actual results of the dice rolls, those results should bear on one’s
credence for what proportion of dice are biased. Kotzen is therefore wrong to say
that the results of the dice rolls in the multiple dice scenario are irrelevant to the
probability of Laura being biased. Note that, nevertheless, the mere fact that other
dice were rolled is irrelevant, i.e. weak defeatism may be true but Kotzen could still
be correct that strong defeatism is false.
This revised dice scenario is the better analogy to real world studies for it is not
certain what proportion of studies are on factors which actually have a real
connection. Thus, it follows that just as weak defeatism is true of the revised dice
scenario, weak defeatism is true when studies are considered.
1 Kotzen recognises this disanalogy in [1, pp. 166, 177]; he says that it is incumbent upon the defeatist to
explain why this disanalogy might be salient—the rest of this section explains just that.
Multiple studies and weak evidential defeat
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The independence argument
Kotzen has other arguments against (both strong and weak) defeatism. One is the
‘independence argument’ [1, p. 160]: given that the other studies are truly
independent of one another, the results of one study says nothing about how other
studies might turn out. If they say nothing whatsoever, both weak and strong
defeatism are false.
Kotzen’s worry can be grasped first by returning to the dice analogy. Instead of
one vat, imagine that there are a million vats. Each vat is filled by a different dice
creating machine. Dials on the machines determine how many biased dice each
machine produces. The dials on the machines have been independently set. Imagine
a die is randomly selected from the vats. Call it ‘Harry’. If it rolls three 6S, then it
would create an ‘improved single die scenario’. But imagine that it is not rolled, and
instead is put back in the vat. We then roll one die each from 100,000 randomly
selected vats. Of those dice which roll three 6S, one is selected. Call it ‘Laura’. This
is the ‘improved multiple dice scenario’.
The results of the other 99,999 dice are prima facie irrelevant to the probability of
Laura being biased. Imagine that all 99,999 dice rolled three 6S. In that case, as long
as the dial settings were fixed independently of one another, the scenario
nevertheless fails to tell us anything about the bias proportion of the vat that
Laura was pulled from. The improved multiple dice scenario is a better analogy of
the multiple study scenario: pairs of factors are analogous to the vats; each die is
analogous to a study one might conduct on the pair; that the dials are independently
fixed is analogous to the different studies being independent of one another, etc. So,
by that analogy, what the results of the other studies are in the multiple study
scenario seems irrelevant, i.e. weak defeatism is false.
But the devil is in the detail. P(LAURAISBIASED) is a function of P(HARRYIS-
BIASED). Even in the improved multiple dice scenario, one might think that the
results of the dice affect P(HARRYISBIASED). Imagine that we have no idea of how to
estimate P(HARRYISBIASED). But imagine that prior to picking out Harry (and prior to
rolling 100,000 dice, and prior to picking out Laura, etc.), we are allowed to roll
some dice from the vats. Call them the ‘anterior dice’. The anterior dice are
randomly selected such that each die may or may not have come from one of the
vats from which we later draw one of the 100,000 dice and, indeed, we do not know
whether some, or all, of the anterior dice came from the same vat. If we are
genuinely at a loss as to how to estimate P(HARRYISBIASED) then we would believe
that it is equiprobable which vat any given die came from. In that case, we should
fix P(HARRYISBIASED) at a value mirroring the proportion of anterior dice which
rolled three 6S. Then, just as clearly, if we roll 100,000 dice from amongst the vats,
then the results of those dice are likewise going to update what we believe about
P(HARRYISBIASED). For instance, imagine that we rolled 10 anterior dice and
estimated P(HARRYISBIASED) on the back of that. That is not as good as rolling
100,009 which would help us better estimate that value. In the improved multiple
dice scenario, the 99,999 rolls of the other dice are just as good as rolling extra
anterior dice. The conclusion is that if one used the anterior dice method to estimate
P(HARRYISBIASED), then, clearly, the results of the other dice rolls are relevant to
N. Effingham, M. J. Price
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P(LAURAISBIASED). That things are the same as they were in the multiple dice
scenario should seem intuitive. In the improved multiple dice scenario, 100,000 dice
are rolled from randomly selected vats. Imagine that the selected dice are put in a
bucket before being rolled. This would now be a situation identical to the multiple
dice scenario.
Strained analogies?
Having added the use of the anterior dice process to the improved multiple dice
scenario, there is now yet another variant scenario: the ‘anterior dice scenario’. If
the anterior dice scenario were analogous to real world scenarios involving multiple
independent studies, then weak defeatism would be false. However, if there were no
analogy of the anterior dice process, our objection to Kotzen would not work. For
there to be an analogy, there must be an anterior studies process whereby the
probability of a study showing a real connection is, at least in part, based upon the
proportion of studies thus far seen which demonstrate significant results. In the rest
of this section, we argue that, in at least some cases, an anterior study process is
used (and, further, should be used in at least some cases).
Before turning to a real world example, consider a fictional case. Imagine a
researcher who has no expertise in, or knowledge relevant to, the field of peanut
butter or cholesterol levels. Whilst she is perfectly rational, she has no idea how to
estimate P(REALCONNECTION), i.e. she has no idea what the prior probability is of
peanut butter ingestion causing lower cholesterol. Nor does she have access to
studies that are not independent of the peanut butter study. But she does have access
to 1000 independent studies. Of those 1000 studies, 10 studies were conducted on
factors that turned out to have a real connection. With nothing better to go on, the
researcher should rationally estimate P(REALCONNECTION) to be 0.01.
Now, imagine that this researcher reads an extra nine thousand studies. Were that
to show that the proportion of studies conducted on factors with a real connection
was, e.g., higher than the proportion in the next nine thousand, this should change
her estimation. After reading 10,000 studies, if she saw that the proportion of studies
conducted on factors with a real connection was in fact 1.3%, then she should
correspondingly adjust P(REALCONNECTION) to be 0.013. This is simply her
deploying the anterior study process. In the multiple study scenario, were the
researcher to discover the results of the other studies, then that would be yet more
information to feed into a revision of P(REALCONNECTION). Hence, the results of the
multiple studies do affect the value of P(REALCONNECTION)—and, therefore, the
value of P(REALCONNECTION|SIGNIFICANTRESULTS)—in the multiple study scenario (as
compared to the single study scenario).
Nor is this relevant only to fiction for there are suitably similar real world cases.
One example concerns diagnostic tests for diseases. Imagine someone tests positive
for a disease. The subjective probability of the subject having the disease depends
upon two things. First, the accuracy of the test: imagine it generates false positives
1% of the time (in uninfected subjects) and never generates false negatives. Second,
the prevalence of the disease in the population: imagine that 1% of the population is
infected. In such a case, the subjective probability of the subject having the disease
Multiple studies and weak evidential defeat
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would be (roughly) 0.5. And in this case, the subject would be a ‘study of one’ (with
their positive test result being analogous to a die which has rolled three 6s). When
one learns more about independently conducted studies (that is, learns more about
the prevalence in the population), one’s subjective probability of the subject having
the disease should vary. For instance, if one came to believe that it was not 1% of
the population which was infected but 2%, then one’s subjective probability that the
subject has the disease should now be roughly 0.66.
A second example involves testing DNA data. James Scott and James Berger use
a Bayesian statistical model for testing DNA data [2]. Where xi is the measured
under- or over-expression of genes, and li is xi’s true mean, it is natural to believe
that (i) the prior probability that li = 0 for any given i is (unless we know any
better!) the same for every i, and (ii) that each value of li is independent. Examining
the different genes is thus equivalent to conducting independent multiple studies on
whether different genes over or under express. And when it comes to fixing the prior
probability of li = 0 for any given i, Scott and Berger say that the ‘emphasis … is
on letting the data themselves (i.e., the results of the independent tests on the genes)’
fix that prior probability [2, p. 2145]. Clearly, this is just the anterior studies process
in action.
So, the anterior studies process is used in the real world. Moreover, were weak
defeatism false, then these cases would have to be conducted differently (which—
especially in the case of diagnostic testing—would be quite a surprise!). Since the
analogy holds, Kotzen’s independence argument does not work.
The generality argument
The final of Kotzen’s arguments which we consider in-depth is his ‘generality
argument’: if defeatism is true, and the existence of some independent studies
influence P(REALCONNECTION|SIGNIFICANTRESULTS), it seems impossible to draw the
line between which studies are relevant and which are not. Are studies about statins
and lower cholesterol relevant? Or eating peanut butter and complications arising
from heart bypass surgery? Or heart bypass surgery and memory loss (which is,
prima facie, totally irrelevant!)? With no good answer to that question, the defeatist
is in trouble [1, pp. 159–160]. One can also consider this objection in relation to
diagnostic disease testing. If testing, say, for the presence of HIV, one might pay
close attention to the results of other HIV tests to feed into one’s prior probabilities.
But one need not pay such attention to any old independent study whatsoever. For
instance, one would not pay such attention to the results of tests on whether people
have chlamydia or diabetes.
We do not believe that this argument demonstrates that weak defeatism is false.
Return to the drudgery of the fictional researcher wading through one thousand, and
then ten thousand, independent studies in order to estimate a value of P(REALCON-
NECTION). The researcher could be asked why she selected those studies. Should the
ten thousand studies include studies about statins and lower cholesterol, or about
peanut butter and heart bypass surgery complications, or about heart bypass surgery
and memory loss, and so on? If the researcher is genuinely ignorant of medical
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issues, we believe that all such studies are relevant to that researcher. After all, what
else should she do? Since there is no alternative to the one we suggest, we think it is
obvious that one should use weak defeatist reasoning in this case—and that,
therefore, Kotzen’s argument cannot be sound.
When someone is less ignorant than this imaginary researcher, it gets trickier.
Improved information changes which studies are relevant. Returning to the anterior
dice scenario, a set of dice, P, is constructed. The results of those dice inform our
prior probability of Harry being biased. If Harry could have come from any vat, and
the dice which are members of P could have come from any vat, the results of dice
from P should inform that probability. But if it were known that Harry came from
amongst the first 50,000 vats, and if it were known which anterior dice came from
vat numbers 1–50,000 and which came from vat numbers 50,001–100,000, then one
would know only to include dice of the former type in P on the grounds that the
other dice are not saliently similar to Harry. The same thinking applies in the case of
studies. Let s be a study which our researcher has read; let R be the set of studies
intended for use in the anterior studies process when estimating the (prior)
probability of a real connection between the factors involved in s; let p be the
principle that our researcher used for selecting s in the first place. Similar to the dice
case, every study in R should be selectable by principle p. If the researcher knows
that p could never have selected a given study, then that study should not be
included in R.
Problematically, there will be many such principles. Some principles appear to be
apposite whilst others do not. For instance, in diagnostic testing, the results of other
HIV tests seem pertinent to the probability of a given individual having HIV; thus a
principle selecting all and only HIV tests seems apposite. In the case of the peanut
butter study, a principle selecting all studies on lower cholesterol caused by a
variety of common edible substances is likewise apposite. But there are principles
which are prima facie odd and bizarre. For instance, imagine that a researcher came
across the peanut butter study by accident whilst rummaging under their sofa. In a
sense, the researcher has used a principle for reading studies which selects studies
left under sofas. But it would be bizarre for R to have as members all and only those
studies that have been discarded under sofas. This problem can be showcased by a
further example. Imagine one reads the peanut butter study in the Journal of Peanut
Butter Studies. Should R include all studies in that journal? Why should it not
include all studies that could have appeared in that journal (so include, e.g., studies
rejected by that journal but accepted elsewhere)? What if every morning I randomly
select a journal to read and happened, that morning, to select Journal of Peanut
Butter Studies—should R now contain studies from any journal whatsoever? There
are a plethora of candidate principles, each generating a distinct set of studies for the
anterior studies process where those studies are all—in some sense or another—
similar to s. In light of this, Kotzen may renew his objection, saying that unless one
can develop a hard and fast rule for picking out which principle is apposite, weak
defeatism is scuppered.
We cannot develop such a hard and fast rule, but we do not believe this to be
damning to weak defeatism. R is a set of studies saliently similar to s with regards to
how s came to be read. Pinning down ‘salient similarity’ has proven difficult in
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other areas so it is no surprise that it proves difficult here. But in the same way that,
in other areas, guidelines can be offered, some rough guidelines can be offered here.
The idea that some resemblances are ‘genuine resemblances’ which better respect
cuts in nature’s joints can be extended [3]. For instance, the first detected electron
and the Eiffel Tower resemble one another in some respect (e.g. they resemble one
another insofar as both of them are the only things mentioned in this sentence). But
that does not mean they genuinely resemble each other. Some predicates are more
natural than others. For instance, ‘__ is a negatively charged particle’ is a more
natural predicate than ‘__ is mentioned in sentence __’ or ‘__ is an artefact designed
by Gustave Eiffel’ [4, 5]. The first predicate ‘better cuts nature at the joints’ than the
latter two. Things resemble one another to the extent that they fall under the same
predicates; things genuinely resemble one another to the extent that they fall under
the same natural predicates. Thus, the Eiffel Tower and an electron’s resemblance
can be accounted for whilst simultaneously capturing the fact that they do not
genuinely resemble each other.
This in place, one can get a sense of which principles are apposite. A principle for
constructing sets of studies is better than another principle when it respects these
genuine resemblances. That is, if principle p1 selects studies whose subject matter
genuinely resembles s to one degree whilst principle p2 selects studies whose
subject matter genuinely resembles s to a greater degree, one should opt for p2 over
and above p1. The apposite principle is simply the principle that is to be preferred
over all others. For example, HIV tests all concern themselves with the presence, or
not, of a particular disease. Having a disease or not is a fairly natural resemblance.
So, a principle selecting other HIV tests (and ignoring tests on other diseases) has a
subject matter (i.e., people having HIV) that better genuinely resembles the original
test than if tests on other diseases were also included. No wonder, then, that one
would focus on a set of such tests when it comes to the anterior studies process. If, in
the peanut butter study case, studies on edible substances and heart disease were
selected, those studies would have subject matters more closely genuinely
resembling that of the peanut butter study than if a principle selecting studies
found under sofas were used. If the latter principle were used, one should probably
believe that the set one constructed would contain studies with disparate subject
matters—one should, therefore, favour using the former principle.
Thus, we suggest that—when faced with a plethora of principles—one should
select the principle which, to the best of one’s knowledge, is best suited to
constructing a set of studies with genuinely similar subject matters. Hence, one
should change which sets are pertinent to the anterior studies process as one learns
more about the world. The thoroughly ignorant researcher imagined above, who
ploughs through ten thousand random studies, does not know that, say, peanut butter
and lower cholesterol do not genuinely resemble the factors appearing in those ten
thousand studies. Hence, she is justified in including them in her set for use in the
anterior studies process. However, in contemporary diagnostic testing, we know that
an infection of HIV genuinely resembles other infections of HIV more than it
genuinely resembles an infection of chlamydia. Hence, the set includes the
independent HIV tests, though not other studies or tests, and is the desirable set to
inform the relevant prior probabilities. The more one learns about the world, the
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more one is clued in as to which sets are better suited to help estimate prior
probabilities. Thus, there is a constraint on how sets of anterior studies are to be
constructed.
The constraint is only rough. One could expand upon it by adding in further
constraints. For instance, the resemblance of the subject matter of studies is just one
desideratum. Another desideratum would be that an apposite principle would
include as many studies as practically possible. Without that desideratum, one
would always favour the set consisting of just that thing which most genuinely
resembles its subject matter, i.e. s itself. But that would be totally uninformative.
Hence, with informativeness in mind, one can build sets with multiple studies in
them even though those studies imperfectly genuinely resemble the subject matter
of s—one must balance the demand for informativeness with the demands
concerning the genuine resemblance of subject matter.
A further constraint can be suggested. Studies should only be included in R if the
prior probabilities of there being real connections between the factors in the studies
are approximately the same before the results of any of the studies are examined.
For instance, if the prior probability of peanut butter lowering cholesterol is 0.01
and the prior probability of peanut butter causing heart arrhythmia is 0.01, then both
may be included in R. In the example case, one would include all (saliently similar)
studies where it is believed that the prior probability of the factors having a real
connection is 0.01. When the results of those studies are discovered, one gets more
information on what proportion of those studies actually demonstrate a real
connection. For instance, one might discover that of those studies one selected to be
included in the anterior set, 2% demonstrated a real connection rather than, as was
assumed, 1%. Information about the anterior studies is simply information about
how good one is at estimating those prior probabilities. In the example case, one
would discover that when the probability of factors having a real connection is
estimated to be 0.01, this is generally an underestimate for studies included in R.
More could be said about the construction of anterior sets. This sketch of some
constraints on the sets nevertheless ameliorates Kotzen’s worries. The original
worry was that there are not any guidelines or restrictions on what studies count
towards affecting one’s credences. The sketch shows that there can be principled
reasons to delimit the sets of studies in some way. Whilst Kotzen thinks weak
defeatism leads to absurd conclusions (e.g., that it might lead to the diagnostic
testing of one disease taking into account the results of prima facie irrelevant
diagnostic tests for other diseases), the sketch shows how to resist that line of
reasoning. It also explains why our totally ignorant researcher is justified in
examining all studies that she comes across. The constraints placed on the
construction of the anterior set depend upon the knowledge that one has. The more
knowledge one acquires, the greater the limits placed on the composition of the
anterior set. In a case of a thoroughly ignorant researcher, no limits are placed on
them and thus, when totally ignorant, every study is relevant to estimating one’s
prior probabilities.
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Conclusion
This concludes our examination of the pertinent arguments Kotzen offers against
weak defeatism.2 We now end by discussing how what we said bears on current
medical practice.
First, we should note that explicitly deploying weak defeatist reasoning is not
new. Not only are there the examples of diagnostic testing, and analysis of DNA
data from Scott and Berger, but there are others as well. In one example, Jonathan
Sterne and George Davey Smith have already noted much of what we have written
about in this article, albeit in the context of interpreting p values [6]. A p value is the
probability that either the observed result, or something more extreme than the
observed result, would be observed were a real connection between studied factors
not present. When it comes to interpreting p values, they are explicit that the results
of independently conducted studies should guide one to the proportion of false
alarms that one should presume there to be, which factors into informing the prior
probability of there being a real connection between studied factors.
In a second example, the prior probability of a genetic variant being associated
with a disease varies depending upon the number of functional genetic variants
along with the number of variants which contribute to the disease. Data about the
latter information (i.e., number of functional genetic variants and number of
contributing variants) bears on the prior probability of association with a disease
[7–9].
In a third example, John Ioannidis believes that the proportion of significant
results appearing in a set of studies provides guidance as to the prior probability of
there being real connections when significant results appear [10]. As an example, he
imagines a whole genome association study testing 100,000 gene polymorphisms
for association with schizophrenia [10, p. 699]. He is explicit that the prior
probability of any given gene being so associated mirrors the proportion of genes
that are associated. Again, this is simply the anterior studies process in action.
However, there are practical issues which make implementation of this weak
defeatist reasoning tricky. For instance, virtually all medical studies are conducted
using classical or frequentist, rather than Bayesian, methods [11]. The anterior study
process, being Bayesian in nature, does not feature in works based on a classical
methodology, scuppering attempts to use the anterior studies process to better
inform one’s priors in the vast majority of studies.3
Further, the simplifying assumptions made of the peanut butter case paint a
misleading picture of how easy it would be to build a statistical model involving the
2 Kotzen’s other arguments are irrelevant given the current dialectic. The triviality problem [1, p. 160]—
that the defeatist appears to be weakening the evidence as a motivation for strong defeatism—is irrelevant
as we do not deploy any such reasoning in arguing for weak defeatism. Similarly, the psychological
problem—that defeatism is committed to thinking that the ‘private psychological states of researchers’ [1,
p. 161] are relevant—is prima facie not a problem for, clearly, weak defeatism commits to no such thing.
The commutativity of evidence issue [1, pp. 161–162]—that it is irrelevant which order one receives
information as to what we draw from that information—is irrelevant as nothing we say indicates that the
order is relevant.
3 Of course, this is merely a descriptive fact—just because most studies do not use Bayesian reasoning
does not mean that they should not [6, 12].
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weak defeatist’s reasoning. For instance, along with Kotzen, we assumed that real
connections are both an all or nothing affair and always turn up significant results
when tested. In real world cases, where these assumptions do not apply, statistical
modelling methods are more complex; therefore, the ratio of effort to reward for
using weak defeatist reasoning may often be quite low. The same is true for other
assumptions—for instance, we have ignored the influence of bias in studies.
Similarly, in many real world cases one often has non-independent studies
available. Information from such studies is likely to swamp information garnered
from independent studies when it comes to estimating prior probabilities. That is not
to say that the information from the independent studies is irrelevant, but just that
the modification made in light of it would, in most (but not all!) cases, likely make
little difference. Given the probable small effect it would have, it will not, in many
cases, be worth the effort to build the appropriate statistical model. In any case, it
would be challenging to develop a statistical methodology to correctly synthesise
independent and non-independent studies of different types.
But this is not to say that the reasoning of the weak defeatist is unsound—even if
it turns out that in the real world, it is often less useful to pay attention to it.
Moreover, whilst in many cases it is inefficient to build weak defeatist reasoning
into a statistical model, that is not true of all cases—the above case of Scott and
Berger’s analysis of DNA is one example in which the reasoning of the weak
defeatist is not only pertinent but also economical to take into account.
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